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Abstract
A standard object of empirical analysis in labor economics is a modified Mincer wage
function in which an individual’s log wage is a function of education, experience, and
race. We analyze this approach in a context where individuals live and work in different
locations (thus facing different housing prices and wages). Our model justifies the
traditional approach, but with the important caveat that the regression should include
location-specific fixed effects. Empirical analysis of men in U.S. labor markets
demonstrates that failure to condition on location causes us to significantly overstate
the decline in black-white wage disparity over the past 60 years.
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1 Introduction
In hundreds of studies social scientists have examined the role of minority status in wage
determination by estimating variants of the Mincer earnings function1,
ln(wi) = β0 + β1Ri + β2Ei + γ (Xi) + i; (1)
the expected log wage of individual i is specified to be a function of an indicator variable
for minority demographic status Ri (e.g., race, ethnicity, or immigrant status), education
Ei (or an alternative measure of human capital), and also, typically, some function of such
covariates as age or experience, given by γ (Xi). An estimated negative value of β1 is taken
as an indication of wage disparity that adversely affects minority workers.
For example, a very large literature uses regression analyses along the lines of
equation (1) to document racial disparities among blacks and whites in the U.S. The disad-
vantaged position of black workers is understood to be the consequence of discrimination
in labor markets and racial differences in the pre-market development of human capital2.
Here we study the properties of wage gap estimates from regression (1) when individ-
uals live in locations that have differing prices, especially differing wages and housing
prices. The central point of our paper is that if we intend to interpret an estimated wage
gap as a welfare difference between groups, we need to account for the fact that these
groups may face different local prices, e.g., may on average live in cities with differing
housing prices.
To structure our thinking about this problem we use a theoretical framework, along
the lines Haurin (1980) and Roback (1982), in which equilibrium prices and wages
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vary across cities because of differences in location-specific amenities and/or produc-
tivity. As is common in such models, we focus on the equilibrium that results when
there is costless migration between locations. The distinctive feature of our model is
that people belong to two racial groups, one of which suffers disadvantage due to dis-
crimination or due to unmeasured differences in human capital. Given this standard
approach to local labor markets, theoretical reasoning leads us to conclude that if pref-
erences are homothetic—a common, though somewhat restrictive, assumption—β1 is a
meaningful parameter measuring disadvantage for the minority group. But, importantly,
consistent estimation of β1 in general requires the inclusion of location fixed effects into
equation (1).
With this observation inmind, we conduct an analysis of black-white wage gaps for men
in the United States from 1940 through 2000—work that roughly parallels (and extends)
the seminal work of Smith andWelch (1989). We find that an analysis that omits location
substantially overstates black-white wage convergence over this period.
Our paper proceeds in four additional sections: Section 2 sets out a standard model of
urban differences in prices, and in that context demonstrates that the race wage gap—
whether generated by discrimination or by human capital differences—is a constant
across different local labor markets if and only if preferences are homothetic. Under that
assumption, estimation of a Mincer wage regression typically requires inclusion of loca-
tion fixed effects. Section 3 presents evidence of the importance of this idea for standard
empirical exercises that examine racial wage gaps. Section 4 revisits our theory, asking
about the implications of our model if the key assumption of homotheticity is violated.
Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Race wage gaps in amultiple-locationmodel
Workers supply labor in local labor markets, and across those markets there are often
substantial differences in wages and other local prices3. Theoretical reasoning in the
urban/regional economic literature, in the pioneering work of Haurin (1980) and Roback
(1982) and in many papers that followed, suggests that observed location-specific
price differences can generally be understood to be the consequences of differences
in locations’ amenities and location-specific differences in productivity. Our goal is to
determine what these models have to say about racial wage disparities in local labor
markets.
We begin with a population in which individuals belong to one of two racial groups:
a minority group, indicated by R = 1, and a majority group, indicated by R = 0. These
people live in one of n cities, and consume two goods: a non-housing good that has a price
1 in every location, and housing, which has a price that varies across cities. We designate
the rental price of housing pj per unit (j = 1, . . . n). Wages also differ across location, and
we want to allow for the possibility of race-based differences in wages: individuals from
racial group R = 0 earn wage w0j in city j, while those from group 1 earn w1j .
For simplicity, we assume that all workers supply one unit of labor, regardless of where
they work. We assume also that all individuals have the same preferences. Finally, as is
typical in these models, we assume that there is costless migration between locations.
Let the expenditure function for workers of each group (R = 0 or 1) living in city j be
eRj = e(pj,uRj ). The key equilibrium condition is that workers of both groups must be
indifferent over their city of residence; for individuals in each racial group, utility uRj is
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the same in each city. Therefore we can drop the subscript j on utility, and note that
equilibrium entails
e(pj,u0) = w0j and e(pj,u1) = w1j for j = 1, . . . , n. (2)
While u0 and u1 must each be invariant across cities, utility might differ between demo-
graphic groups if their earnings differ. As we have noted, this latter outcome is possible
if the two groups differ in terms of productivity or if there is racial discrimination that
results in wage disparity. With this in mind, we consider an “equality index” in location j,
which we define to be the ratio of the wage for the minority group 1 relative to the wage








This equality index will be less than one if the minority group is disadvantaged or greater
than one if the minority group is advantaged. Importantly, in general this ratio is seen to
depend on the housing price pj.
When is the equality index independent of location-specific price variation? First, note
that if preferences are such that individuals’ expenditure functions takes a “separable”




f (u0) , which
does not depend on local prices. Second, and more importantly, note that the converse is
true. The proof is simple: Let Ij = g(u0,u1), so that the index in location j does not depend
on that location’s prices. Without loss of generality we can take u0 = 1, u1 = u. Then
Ij = e(pj ,u)e(pj ,1) = g(u, 1), so we can write e(pj,u) = e(pj, 1) ·g(u, 1). Settingψ(p) ≡ e(p, 1) and
f (u) ≡ g(u, 1) we find that the expenditure function has the form e(p,u) = ψ(p)f (u).
A familiar result from price theory is that the expenditure function takes the form
e(p,u) = f (u)ψ(p) if and only if preferences are homothetic. We thus have a key proposi-
tion: In an equilibrium model of local labor markets, the racial equality index is the same
across locations if and only if preferences are homothetic.
As long as preferences are homothetic, it proves quite easy to relate our theory back to
the familiarMincer wage regression (1). Under homotheticity, the form of the expenditure
function is w = ψ(p)f (u). Using the logarithmic form of this equation, for a person i
living in city j we have
ln(wij) = ln(ψ(pj)) + ln(f (uRi)), (4)
where Ri indicates the individual i’s race (Ri = 0 or 1). Since ψ(pj) is independent of
utility, local wage levels vary with local prices, but log racial wage disparity is a constant
that is invariant with regard to location. Thus we can let β j0 ≡ ln(ψ(pj)) + ln(f (uR0)) and
β1 ≡ ln(f (uR1)) − ln(f (uR0)), and we have the structural relationship
ln(wij) = β j0 + β1Ri, (5)
where β1 the penalty (or premium) to minority status.
Mincer famously provided theoretical reasoning to expect that log wage increases lin-
early in years of education (Ei), and in addition is increasing in experience. If so, and if the
returns to education and experience are the same for minority and majority workers, f (u)
should be proportional to eβ2Ei+γ (Xi), where γ (Xi) is an increasing function of experience
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(Xi)4. Then, assuming additional variation in the observed log age can be represented by
an independent additive error term ij, we have
ln(wij) = β j0 + β1Ri + β2Ei + γ (Xi) + ij. (6)
This is the same as the familiar equation (1) with the important proviso that local labor
market fixed effects (j = 1, · · · , n) must be included5. More generally, it might be advis-
able to treat the return to education as non-linear (see, e.g., Heckman et al. 2006), which
is the approach we take in our empirical application below.
In the U.S. there is large variability in housing prices across cities. In general, utility
losses individuals experience by locating in a particularly expensive city will differ among
individuals. Furthermore, these utility losses might systematically be correlated with race,
if only because blacks are on average poorer than whites. This is where the homothetic-
ity assumption comes into play. When an individual experiences a price increase, real
income of course decreases. But if preferences are homothetic, the proportional decrease
in real income is the same for all individuals6. Put another way, the proportional increase
in the wage needed to induce people to live in a particularly expensive city will be the
same across all individuals, and therefore the proportional wage gap between whites and
blacks will be the same in each location. All that is required to estimate this gap is that the
researchers estimate the wage regression using the log of wage as the dependent variable
(i.e., use the Mincer specification) and include fixed effects to capture location-specific
price differentials.
On the other hand, if there are serious violations of homotheticity, equilibrium black-
white wage gaps will differ across cities. The same is true if markets are substantially out
of equilibrium. We return to these issues in Section 4 below. First, though, we turn to
empirical implementations of our key regression (6), asking if the inclusion of location
fixed effects matters for inferences about racial wage gaps in the U.S.
3 The importance of location for evaluating the black-white wage gap
We consider here an important application—measuring the black-white wage conver-
gence over the past few decades. A generation of labor economists is now familiar with
the basic picture presented in Smith and Welch’s seminal 1989 paper, “Black Economic
Progress After Myrdal.” Smith andWelch demonstrated that for men the black-white gap
in weekly wages declined from −57 percent in 1940 to −27 percent in 1980. Here we
update the basic facts about this trend by evaluating also results in 1990 and 2000, and
we proceed with an additional contribution: we evaluate the role of location in drawing
inferences about the trend in black-white wage gap.
Like Smith and Welch (1989), and many other authors, we estimate black-white wage
gap using public use samples from the U.S. Decennial Census. There are substantial
advantages to these data for this purpose. First, they provide us with an opportunity
to examine the economic progress of African Americans relative to whites over a long
period using data from instruments that are similar both in terms of content and mode of
administration. Second, the data provide extremely large samples, and therefore allow for
precise estimates.
While there are some serious limitations with the Census data in regard to the vari-
ables available, we do have data on key economic outcome variables like earned income
and labor supply, along with race, age, and education, and we have some information on
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location of residence. Even though the variables are quite limited, we are able to establish
quite convincingly our central point—that treatment of location is very important in the
estimation and interpretation of the decline in black-white disparity in U.S. labor markets
over the past six decades.
For our analysis, we restrict attention to men7. We begin by dividing respondents on
the basis of race—black and non-Hispanic white—and exclude other racial/ethnic groups.
We are interested in wages earned by “prime aged” full-time working men, so we restrict
attention to men aged 25–55 who worked at least 27 weeks in the previous year8. In our
analysis we use age, which we have in 31 discrete categories (individual years, 25 though
55 inclusive), education, which we have in 10 categories (“no schooling or kindergarten
only” through “ more than a bachelor’s degree”), and location, which we have for several
hundred unique localities9.
Our primary focus is on the measurement of black-white wage disparity, conditional on
observable characteristics. To give the simplest possible example, suppose we are inter-
ested in conditioning only on age.We can proceed as follows. Let b index black individuals
and w index white individuals, and let xi be the exact year age of individual i. Let yi be
the log wage of individual i, and let E(yb,i|x) be the expected value of the log wage of that




[E(yb,i|x) − E(yw,i|x)] fb(x), (7)
where fb(x) is p.d.f. of age among black workers. The idea of looking at the object
[E(yb,i|x) − E(yw,i|x)] is of course that E(yw,i|x) provides a missing counterfactual to the
question: What would be the expected log wage of a black worker age x if he were treated
in the labor market as a similarly aged white worker?10 Then by averaging difference over
the age distribution of black workers we are looking at the “average treatment effect on
the treated.”
Our theoretical reasoning suggests that we need to evaluate  within locations. Since
we are interested in the “average treatment effect” over all locations, we can follow an
approach comparable to that given in (7) but now let x index a location-age cell (e.g., one
cell will bemen aged 31 residing in Houston). Notice that in the Census data there will be




[E(yb,i|x) − E(yw,i|x)] fb(x), (8)
where N is the number of age-location cells.
Finally, there is a tradition in race wage regressions of controlling also for school-
ing. Given that education in our data is categorized in discrete cells (as discussed in
the appendix), we continue to adopt a non-parametric approach. In this instance we
simply let x index a location-age-education cell (e.g., high-school educated men aged 31
in Houston), and now let fb(x) represent the distribution of the black population over
these cells.
We could directly estimate equation (8) by calculating the conditional means at each
point in the distribution of covariates and then taking averages. As a practical mat-
ter, we implement an estimation procedure that returns us to the traditional regression
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framework. Let ˆ be the non-parametric matching estimator based on the direct
approach of (8), and let βˆ1 be the weighted OLS estimator of the regression
yi = β0 + β1Ri + i. (9)
With a bit of algebra it is possible to establish that ˆ ≡ βˆ1 if the weights are constructed
as follows:
The first step in constructing the weights is to realize that the Census data themselves
come with weights that allow one to mimic the U.S. population. In the appendix we
describe our treatment of missing data. Our approach is to assume that data are, condi-
tional on the age-race-education-race cell, missing at random. We thereby construct new
weights; for an individual in a particular cell x0 the weight, adjusted for missing data, is
w1(x0). Now consider the conditional “probability of being black” for that particular cell:
p(x0) = Pr(Ri = 1|x = x0). (10)
Having calculated this probability for each cell, we proceed by defining a new final set of




w1(x0) if the worker is black, and
w1(x0)
p(x0)
1 − p(x0) if the worker is white.
(11)
Notice that if there is a white worker who is not matched to a black worker at all in the
data (i.e., p(x0) = 0), that individual is dropped from the analysis, and if his characteristics
are quite dissimilar from typical black workers in the sample he will be given low weight.
Conversely, white individuals who have characteristics that are more typical of the black
individuals in the sample are weighted more highly. Intuitively, our re-weighting scheme
forces the distribution of covariates in the sample of whites to be identical to the distribu-
tion of covariates in the sample of blacks. In the matching context, this is often referred
to as “inverse probability weighting”11.
It is important to keep in mind that the estimate of the average treatment effect con-
tains the impact of “unobservables.” Thus, for example, if we implement our estimator
by matching on all available observables (age, location, and education), we are still leav-
ing out important ways in which black and white workers differ in the labor market. For
example, Black et al. (2006) document that black men choose college majors that are sys-
tematically less lucrative than those chosen by white men. Because the Census does not
contain information on college major (i.e., it is an unobservable), we are unable to condi-
tion on this variable. Similarly, Neal (2006) documents large differences in the cognitive
test scores of African Americans relative to whites. Lack of such test scores in the Cen-
sus means that any impacts of that variable are imbedded in the unobservables and their
correlation with observable measures.
Finally, we are analyzing wages of men who work 27 weeks a year or more. While the
wages of working individuals are indeed important, so are the issues concerning racial
differences in labor force nonparticipation. Three well-known facts are germane: First,
nonparticipation rates of African American men are higher than the corresponding non-
participation rates of whites. Second, nonparticipation rates are inversely correlated with
education, and presumably nonparticipation also varies with unobservable skills as well.
Third, nonparticipation rates have been growing over time12. Chandra (2000) gives an
excellent review of the issues involved. Here we ignore these concerns, and focus instead
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on the role of location for understanding the racial wage gap among those who are
working.
Table 1 gives results. We estimate regression (9) using weighted OLS with weights given
in (11). In column (1) we report the outcome in which we match on age only. There is,
of course, a compelling reason to match on age, since productivity is related to age, and
since age is, from the perspective of labor market participant, exogenous. Having done
so, we estimate the black-white log wage gap to be an astonishing −0.74 in 1940. This gap
declines to a still-substantial −0.31 in 1980 and to −0.26 in 200013. An important feature
of our estimates is convergence; the log wage gap declines by approximately 48 log points
over the period of study.
Given the assumptions of our model—that equilibrium always holds and that prefer-
ences are homothetic—wage gaps can be thought of as money-metric measures of the
welfare disadvantage to being black in the American labor market. These measures are
correctly estimated only after matching black and white individuals within labor mar-
kets. Column (2) of Table 1 reports the resulting estimates of this latter sort (but not
adjusting for educational differences among blacks and whites)14. There are substantial
differences in the inferences we draw using estimates in column (2), which makes loca-
tion adjustments, and column (1), which does not. We see, for example, that within local
labor markets the 1940 log wage gap is now “only” −0.66, instead of −0.74. Apparently
in 1940 blacks disproportionately resided in labor markets that had relatively low wages
for workers generally. By 2000, though, the racial distribution of residence had changed
substantially, and in consequence a log wage gap that accounts for location is larger in
absolute value than one that does not, −0.31 vs. −0.26. Taking this approach we find a
convergence of 35 log points, not 48 log points. Put another way, failure to treat location
properly leads us to overestimate black-white wage convergence by nearly 40 percent15.
Table 1 Black-white gaps in log weekly wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No No Yes Yes Yes
Location (MSA) No Yes No Yes No
Location (Region) No No No No Yes
1940 -0.741 -0.662 -0.584 -0.495 -0.478
(0.0119) (0.0081) (0.0093) (0.0086) (0.0114)
1950 -0.511 -0.485 -0.400 -0.365 -0.348
(0.0139) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0125) (0.0126)
1960 -0.510 -0.489 -0.372 -0.366 -0.332
(0.0070) (0.0063) (0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0064)
1970 -0.447 -0.448 -0.315 -0.329 -0.281
(0.0138) (0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0047) (0.0062)
1980 -0.308 -0.332 -0.238 -0.256 -0.218
(0.0125) (0.0031) (0.0049) (0.0022) (0.0042)
1990 -0.281 -0.323 -0.212 -0.248 -0.193
(0.0054) (0.0027) (0.0054) (0.0022) (0.0040)
2000 -0.259 -0.310 -0.197 -0.236 -0.184
(0.0070) (0.0027) (0.0049) (0.0022) (0.0036)
Source: Authors’ calculations, 1940 to 2000 I-PUMS. Dependent variable is the logarithm of weekly earnings. See the data
appendix for details.
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As we have noted, it is common in the literature to condition on both age and education
when evaluating wage gaps. The idea is to try to sort out howmuch of the race “treatment
effect” is due to differences in years of formal schooling acquired by workers. We thus
conduct our exercise matching on age and education in column (3) and on age, education,
and location in column (4). In this case also, inferences about convergence are greatly
affected by matching on location: In a specification that does not condition on location,
the gap is estimated to decline by 39 log points, but within location the gap declines by
27 log points. Failure to condition on location again leads us to overestimate black-white
wage convergence, in this case by approximately 45 percent16.
We know of no other empirical work on the black-white wage gap in which analyses
take detailed account of location, as we have in columns (2) and (4) of Table 1. How-
ever, in the previous literature wage regressions do occasionally include regional indicator
variables, so in column (5) we try a specification in which we match on location using
Census region indicators only. Such region indicators are not a good substitute for our
more detailed location controls. Estimated gaps are consistently lower using this specifi-
cation than in column (4)—an indication that even within regions, blacks and whites live
in systematically different labor markets.
What are the shifting patterns of residence that have such an important impact when we
estimate black-white wage gaps? Table 2 provides the basic answer. In that table we report
the results of the following exercise: We begin by calculating the extent to which black
men disproportionately reside in the South. We do this by constructing an index equal
to the ratio of “the fraction of black men aged 25–55 living in the South” to “the fraction
of white men aged 25–55 living in the South.” This index equals 1 if the same proportion
of black men as white men live in the South. We construct a comparable index for urban
residency. The table indicates that in 1940 black men were very heavily over-represented
in the South—the index is nearly 3—and substantially under-represented in urban areas.
By 2000, the over-representation in Southern residence weakened substantially, and black
men were disproportionately likely to live in urban areas.
Clearly, the large changes in residential patterns make an important difference when
we are thinking about black-white wage inequality. Over time, blacks have generally
moved from low-cost low-wage rural areas, largely in the South, to disproportionately
high-cost high-wage urban locations throughout the country. Our empirical work indi-
cates that failure to condition on detailed location causes us to overestimate the absolute
Table 2 Location indices for blackmen
(1) (2)








Notes: Authors’ calculations, 1940 to 2000 PUMS. The southern residency index is the ratio of fraction black men aged 25 to 55
inclusive to white men of the same age. The MSA residency index is, for similar aged men, the ratio of black men to white men
residing in an MSA. The 1970 southern residency index is created using the 1 percent state sample rather than the metro sample
used in the rest of this paper because region of residency is not uniquely identified for MSAs that straddle the border of the
southern region.
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degree of the racial wage disparity in the early years of our analysis (prior to 1970) but to
underestimate disparity in each year after 1970.
More generally, we see the empirical work we present here as underscoring the value
of taking into consideration the role of location in the process of evaluating labor market
phenomenon. In this respect our work is related to important recent research by Moretti
(2013), who shows that careful attention to price differences across locations alters our
understanding of changes in inequality in U.S. over the past 30 years.
4 What if preferences are non-homothetic?
The structural models we estimate above rely on homotheticity of individual preferences.
As it turns out, matters become substantially more complicated if preferences are not
homothetic. In particular, the steps we took in deriving equation (6) no longer pertain;
equilibrium racial wage disparity varies by location. We examine these issues by looking
at two cases—one in which there are location-specific differences in productivity and one
in which there is variation in local amenities.
Suppose that minority workers have (unobserved) lower levels of human capital
than majority-group workers. Suppose also that there is variation across cities in
productivity17. The city with higher productivity will have higher wages and in conse-
quence will typically have higher housing prices. In this setting, we are interested in
learning how race wage gaps vary across locations.
Continue to let u1 and u0 be utility levels, respectively, of minority and majority work-
ers. Given that minority workers have a lower level of human capital, and thus within each
city lower wages, their utility will also be lower; u1 < u0. The equality index in a given
city with a housing price p is I = e(p,u1)e(p,u0) .
We want to know how this index in a low-price, low-productivity city compares to
the index in a higher-price city. We conduct this thought experiment by evaluating the





























Shephard’s lemma indicates that the derivative of the expenditure function with respect
to p is the demand for housing. So (13) can in turn can be written in terms of the budget





This latter expression is positive if minority workers allocate a higher share of their
income to housing than do their majority counterparts. Given that minority workers have
relatively lower income, this amounts to the assumption that the income elasticity of
housing is less than one. As we mention above, there are some estimates that place the
permanent income elasticity of housing demand near one, but others do suggest that it is
less than one18. If so,
∂I
∂p > 0. (15)
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Given that cities with relatively high productivity are also cities with higher housing prices
in this example, we expect that the wage equality index will be higher in high-productivity
cities than in low-productivity cities. This means that for a disadvantaged minority, the
equality index will be closer to 1; the proportional nominal wage gap will be smaller (in
absolute value) in the high-productivity city.
It is quite easy to explain the logic of this proposition. Suppose individuals live in one
of two locations—to take a concrete example, say Memphis and Chicago in 1940—and
suppose that in each location black workers (the minority in this example) earn less than
their white counterparts because of differences in human capital. Suppose further that all
workers are more productive in Chicago, owing perhaps to Chicago’s industrial agglom-
erates. In equilibrium we expect Chicago to have higher wages than Memphis and also to
have a relatively higher housing price. What about the black-white wage gap in the two
cities? Given that the elasticity of demand for housing is less than one, the relatively high
housing price in Chicago places a greater burden on the (poorer) black workers than the
(richer) white workers. Thus if both black and white workers are indifferent between liv-
ing in Memphis and Chicago, as they must be in equilibrium, black workers will require
a larger “Chicago wage premium” than will white workers; the proportional gap between
black and white wages will be smaller (in absolute value) in Chicago than in Memphis.
Thus the equality index is higher in the more expensive city (Chicago). This is what (15)
shows.
The same conclusion follows if the minority wage gap is instead generated by labor mar-
ket discrimination rather than human capital differences. Notice, first of all, that under
our assumption of costless mobility, a discriminated-against black worker will be willing
to live in either city, Memphis and Chicago, only if utility is the same in the two locations.
Thus the equilibrium condition (2) continues to hold, as do our subsequent derivations,
leading to (15). Again, the resulting wage disparity must be smaller in Chicago than in
Memphis. Intuitively, the utility cost must be the same in the two places, and this can
happen only if the proportional wage gap is smaller in the location with higher housing
prices.
Another mechanism for generating price differentials across locations is differentials
in location-specific amenities. In general, the value of a location-specific amenity will
vary according to individuals’ incomes. For example, good public transportation might
be more valuable to individuals who cannot afford a car and good public education is
more important to people who don’t view private education as a viable option. Simi-
larly, variety in gourmet restaurants is typically more valuable to wealthy individuals. In
turn, the value of amenities will be correlated by race if there are race-related differences
in income.
As in the example above (with location-specific differences in productivity), the equilib-
rium black-white wage gap varies across locations. But in this case we can be less certain
about the relationship between the black-white wage gap and housing prices.
Our theoretical analysis implies, in short, that there will likely be differences across
cities in equilibrium black-white wage gaps if our assumption of homotheticity in prefer-
ences is violated. With this in mind, we provide in Table 3 estimated black-white log wage
gaps for individual labor markets—for the 14 metropolitan areas with the largest black
population concentrations of black men in 1940, 1950, and 1970 through 2000. These
estimates match on individuals’ age and education (as in column (4) of Table 1)19.
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Table 3 Black-white gaps in log weekly wages, by city
Cities 1940 1950 1970 1980 1990 2000
Southern
Houston -0.834 -0.367 -0.425 -0.270 -0.299 -0.325
Memphis -0.742 -0.454 -0.461 -0.319 -0.343 -0.248
Atlanta -0.687 -0.472 -0.482 -0.288 -0.293 -0.253
New Orleans -0.669 -0.612 -0.460 -0.317 -0.298 -0.286
South Atlantic
Washington -0.569 -0.374 -0.333 -0.225 -0.214 -0.187
Baltimore -0.444 -0.333 -0.341 -0.254 -0.280 -0.266
Northeastern
New York -0.478 -0.344 -0.301 -0.280 -0.282 -0.270
Philadelphia -0.462 -0.394 -0.237 -0.259 -0.262 -0.266
Midwestern
St. Louis -0.515 -0.456 -0.298 -0.261 -0.309 -0.261
Cleveland -0.507 -0.303 -0.280 -0.205 -0.221 -0.265
Chicago -0.452 -0.331 -0.278 -0.268 -0.297 -0.303
Detroit -0.376 -0.237 -0.208 -0.188 -0.206 -0.244
Western
Los Angeles -0.486 -0.283 -0.301 -0.275 -0.234 -0.244
San Francisco -0.345 -0.255 -0.254 -0.236 -0.215 -0.229
F-Statistic 37.2 10.3 29.5 38.5 22.9 18.6
Authors’ calculations, 1940 to 2000 I-PUMS. The F-Statistic is for the test of equality of coefficients; in each regression the p-value
is less than 0.0001.
The most striking feature of these statistics is the wide variation across cities in esti-
mated log wage gaps. Consider, for example, the estimates from 1940. Southern cities
generally had the largest gaps—in the neighborhood of −0.70 to −0.80—and these gaps
are in some cases twice as large (in absolute values) as the gaps observed in cities with the
smallest wage gaps. If this variation is an equilibrium phenomenon, it could reflect that
productivity in general is higher in cities outside the South.
Of course there are other plausible explanations for this variation. For example, Charles
and Guryan (2008) emphasize that there is substantial variation across U.S. locations in
prejudice, and that this variation is responsible for some of the variation in black-white
gaps in wages. Also, Card and Krueger (1992) document that in the early part of the
twentieth century the quality of education afforded African American children was par-
ticularly poor in much of the South. Both of these factors are surely at work in shaping
the observed patterns.
More generally, there is good reason to think that observed outcomes in 1940 are not
an equilibrium outcome in which utility is constant across locations for each racial group.
After all, this year was near the beginning of the epochal “second great migration,” dur-
ing which millions of African Americans migrated out of the South, in part, no doubt,
to escape poor economic conditions in the South. We are mindful that the assump-
tion of costless migration is often unrealistic in location models, and that this concern
might be especially germane for the application at hand. In this case we can still inter-
pret our estimates in Table 1 as a weighted average of wage gaps that vary across different
locations.
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Our primary point, in any event, is that if we want to look at black-white wage conver-
gence in the U.S. since 1940 we miss a great deal if we simply look at national averages.
Returning to Table 3, which considers cities separately, we notice interesting differences
in trends in the black-white wage gap. Perhaps the most striking feature in the table con-
cerns trends in the black-white wage gap post 1970. In the Southern and South Atlantic
cities there are substantial reductions in that gap—reductions on the order of 0.10 to
0.20—from 1970 through 2000. In contrast, there was very little narrowing of the black-
white wage gap after 1970 in other urban locations in the country. Indeed, over that span
the gap increased in such populous cities as Philadelphia, Chicago, and Detroit. Observed
declines in national black-white gaps in recent decades reflect declines in some locations
(especially in the South), along with the relocation of African Americans across cities,
rather than black-white convergence that occurred uniformly across the country.
5 Conclusions
We have set up a simple model in which prices vary across location. Our model ratio-
nalizes a simple approach to estimating racial wage gaps. We show, in particular, that the
traditional approach of including a race indicator variable in a Mincer wage regression
provides an economically interpretable estimate if one includes location fixed effects in
the regression. Of course, most empirical analyses of the black-white wage gap do not
include such fixed effects.
Our empirical exercise entails an update of Smith and Welch’s classic work on the evo-
lution of black-white wage disparity amongmen.We find that for the 1940 to 2000 period,
we overestimate black-white wage convergence by 45 percent when we fail to condition
on location20.
More generally, we present concerns about the assumptions that lead to our structural
model. In particular, if preferences are not homothetic, it is no longer the case that the
racial log wage gap is a constant across locations, even when the racial utility gap is the
same across locations (as it must be in equilibrium). Moreover, for many applications, the
equilibrium assumption is probably not tenable. A great deal of work remains to resolve
these issues as economists seek to better understand the nature of racial inequality in
labor markets.
Appendix
Data appendix for census analysis
All of the Census data for this paper are taken from integrated data sets of the Public Use
Micro Samples (IPUMS) that were released in each of these Censuses, 1940 through 2000.
See Ruggles et al. (2008) for details.
Respondents were asked about their earnings in the previous year, the number of weeks
worked that year, and, at least for the 1980–2000 Censuses, the usual hours worked
that year. Baum-Snow and Neal (2009), however, document systematic biases that dif-
fer by race and sex in responses to hours worked. We thus investigate results for both
weekly earnings and hourly earnings, finding similar results. We report results for weekly
earnings.
Our goal is to provide an analysis similar to that of Smith andWelch (1989). Toward that
end, we make many data-use decisions that parallel theirs, though there are differences
that we outline here. Like Smith and Welch we restrict our analysis to workers who work
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at least 27 weeks. As for age restrictions, Smith and Welch consider men aged 16 to 64.
We are concerned about the growth of enrollment in high school and college, and we do
not want to worry about decisions of “early retirement,” so we limit our analysis to men 25
to 55 inclusive. To deal with the issue of schooling, Smith andWelch drop men from their
sample who are enrolled in school if they work less than 50 weeks a year. Given our age
restrictions, we find that adjustment to be unnecessary. Smith andWelch exclude unpaid
family workers, military personnel, and the self-employed who are not in the agricultural
industry. We also exclude unpaid family workers, military personnel, the self-employed,
and all agricultural workers21.
We also follow Smith and Welch in limiting the sample to workers whose reported
weekly earnings meet a minimum limit on weekly wages and an upper limit. The adopted
limits are shown in Table 4.
The limits for 1940 to 1980 are taken from Smith and Welch (p. 522, footnote 5). For
1990 and 2000, we indexed the 1980 values to the CPI and rounded up.
An important concern with the Census data is item nonresponse. Respondents occa-
sionally choose not to answer questions about their age, race, ethnicity, or education
level. More frequently, respondents omit answers to questions about hours worked or
earnings. Our approach is to drop respondents who do not answer questions about age,
race, Hispanic status, education, or earnings. We do, however, increase the weights on
other respondents with identical ages, race, and education levels to reflect the missing
data by using inverse probability weighting. To be precise, we estimate the probably of a
nonresponse, or
Pr(NR = 1|X = x0) = f (x0),
where x indexes the age-race-education-location cell, and then we construct weights, w1,
w1(x0) ≡ w01 − f (x0) ,
wherew0 are the initial Census weights. Thus, if half the people in the age-race-education-
location cell do not respond to their earnings or hours worked questions, the responders
within the cell have their weights doubled22. This procedure implicitly assumes that data
are, conditional on the age-race-education-location cell, missing at random. Because we
condition on age, race, education, and location, this procedure also replicates the Census
joint distribution of the age-race-education-location variables.
We face three important issues when it comes to the measurement of education. First,
in 1990 the Census Bureau reworked the education question to account for highest degree
for those with a college education and some categorical data for lower levels of education.
Table 4 Limits of weekly earnings, by year
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For instance, in 1990 the Census asked: “How much school has this person COM-
PLETED? Fill ONE circle for the highest level COMPLETED or degree RECEIVED. If
currently enrolled, mark the level of previous grade attended or highest degree received.”
Response options were: No school completed; Nursery school; Kindergarten; 1st, 2nd,
3rd, or 4th grade; 5th, 6th, 7th, or 8th grade; 9th grade; 10th grade; 11th grade; 12th grade,
no diploma; High school graduate - high school diploma or the equivalent (e.g., GED);
Some college but no degree; Associate degree in college - Occupational program; Asso-
ciate degree in college - Academic program; Bachelor’s degree (For example: BA, AB, BS;
Master’s degree (For example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA); Professional school
degree (For example: MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD); Doctorate degree (For example: PhD,
EdD).
Prior to 1990, the Census asked instead about “years of schooling.” For instance, in 1980
the Census asked: “What is the highest grade (or year) of regular school this person has
ever attended? Fill one circle. If now attending school, mark grade person is in. If high
school was finished by equivalency test (GED), mark ‘12’.” Response options for highest
grade attended were: Never attended school; Nursery school; Kindergarten, and these
further options: Elementary through high school (grade or year: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12); College (academic years: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or more).
Drawing consistent inferences with schooling data drawn these two ways is in principle
quite simple if the two types of questions have a similar structure of measurement error.
Unfortunately, for the 1990 Census, Black et al. (2003) document that the education ques-
tions exhibit significant measurement error and that the degree of measurement error is
correlated with race. Moreover, there was a dramatic increase in the educational attain-
ment of Americans over the period. For instance, in 1940 88 percent of blacks and 64
percent of whites between the ages of 25 and 60 did not have a high school education, and
only 2 percent of blacks and 8 percent of whites had a bachelor’s degree or better. By 2000,
only 9 percent of blacks and 5 percent of whites did not have a high school degree while
fully 33 percent of whites and over 19 percent of blacks had a bachelor’s degree or better.
In our regression analysis we treat education in a non-parametric way, and given the
available data, we use the following ten education categories: no formal education or
kindergarten only, 1 to 4 years, 5 to 8 years, 9 years, 10 years, 11 years, 12 years, some
college but no bachelor’s degree, bachelor’s degree, and more than a bachelor’s degree.
Finally, there is the issue of the measurement of location. Because of the growth in
cities and changes in disclosure policy, the identification of metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) varies over time. In 1960 (the first public use micro sample that the Census
Bureau released), the only geography identified was State of residence. As a result, we can-
not conduct the same location analysis of interest to us with the 1960 data; we use only
an urban indicator interacted with an indicator for state of residence. In 1940, 1950, and
1970 through 2000, we use MSA of residence for those respondents living in a MSA. For
those respondents not living in an identified MSA, we use an indicator for state of resi-
dence. Hence, we exploit the geographical variation that is generally available to us. There
are, however, a few additional noteworthy limitations:
First, residents of some current MSA’s are not separately identified in the early cen-
suses, but are so identified subsequently. For example, in the 1940, Orlando residents are
treated as individuals living in “rural” Florida, but in later years are broken out as part of
an Orlando MSA. Similarly, Las Vegas is identified only starting in 1970. There are a host
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of smaller towns that are only identified in later years. Moreover, MSAs can be created
from regions that were previously a part of different MSAs. This is a particular problem
in the densely populated areas of the east and west coasts. Finally, for areas that are only
identified as “rural” we may be mixing residents from very different areas of a given state.
For example, this designation mixes residents of the desert areas of Southern California
with residents of rural Northern California, who may face very different labor markets
and price levels.
For the 1940 through 1970 Censuses, we use a one-percent sample of respondents, and
from 1980 to 2000, we use the five-percent sample, which, along with population growth,
provides much larger sample sizes andmuchmore precise estimates23. Finally, we note an
important data limitation with the 1950 Census. In 1950, only the “sample line” respon-
dents were asked about education and earnings by the Census Bureau. Hence, only about
3.3 percent of the population was given these questions. Thus, estimates from the 1950
Census are considerably less precise than estimates from even the 1940 Census.
In 1960 and 1970, the Census asked only for hours of work and weeks of work on
intervals. To impute the actual levels, we took information from the 1980 Census and
calculated the average weeks (or average hours) conditional on the being in the relevant
category. The exact imputed values are presented in Table 5.
Prior to 1980, the Census did not ask the usual hours worked so we used hours last week
as a proxy. In 1980, conditional on both reports being positive, the correlation is only 0.61.
While quite low, this correlation is not materially different than those found in validation
studies; see Barron et al. (1997) for a discussion.
Endnotes
1See Mincer (1974).
2Charles and Guryan (2008) document patterns of black-white wage disparity consistent
with Becker’s model of taste-based discrimination. Many important papers speak to
the emergence of black-white differences in human capital development. For example,
Cunha et al. (2006) provide an insightful analysis of human capital development, includ-
ing the emergence of racial and ethnic disparities, and provide an extensive reference to
the literature; Card and Krueger (1992) analyze the consequences of school quality for
black-white earnings differences; and Neal and Johnson (1996) and Neal (2006) demon-
strate the importance of cognitive ability (measured when individuals are young) for
subsequent labor market success.
3Through out the paper, we will refer to locally priced goods and services as “housing,”
which surely has the largest budget share among locally priced goods. Of course, many
Table 5 Imputed values of weeks and hours of work
Interval Imputed weeks Interval Imputed hours
1–13 weeks 1.1 1–14 hours 8.57
14–26 weeks 21.4 15–29 hours 21.95
27–39 weeks 33.3 30–34 hours 30.64
40–47 weeks 43.4 35–39 hours 36.35
48–49 weeks 48.3 40 hours 40
50–52 weeks 51.8 41–48 hours 45.46
49–59 hours 51.41
60 or more hours 67.02
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goods and services are locally priced (e.g., haircuts are more expensive in Chicago than in
Peoria). The cost of living varies widely between cities. Compare, for example, December
2009 cost of living index from city-data.com for Austin (87.2) and Los Angeles (166.6).
4There is an important caveat to the Mincer theory: Black et al (2009) show that β2,
the “return to education,” will differ by location if preferences are not homothetic. Here,
though, we are assuming homotheticity, and in that case returns are the same for each
location.
5Location fixed effects can be safely omitted only if the vector of location indicator vari-
ables is orthogonal to other included variables, in which case those effects are absorbed
into the error term. As we show below, though, black and white workers differ substan-
tially in location patterns.
6The is is a central point in the literature on price indices. See, for example, Samuelson
and Swamy (1974). In our context homotheticity means that the income elasticity of
housing is 1. This might not be too far off the mark. In Epple and Seig’s (1999) general
equilibrium model, the permanent income elasticity of housing is estimated to be 0.94.
Drawing on evidence from partial equilibrium empirical analysis, Harmon (1988) places
it at 1, while Haurin and Lee (1989) give an estimate of 1.1.
7Female labor markets are equally interesting, and we intend to evaluate black-white
wage gaps among women in future work.
8We exclude unpaid family workers, military personnel, the self-employed, and those
employed in agriculture. See the data appendix for more detail. In general we pattern
our exclusion rules after Smith and Welch (1989), although there are some substan-
tial differences. The data appendix also outlines how we construct the key wage
variable.
9The data appendix discusses our location variables. These vary somewhat over the 60
years of analysis.
10Notice that the “treatment” here is not merely the absence of potential racial dis-
crimination in the labor market. Being treated as a white person includes other facets,
including improved pre-market conditions that affect human capital.
11See Hirano et al. (2003) and DiNardo et al. (1996) for discussions. See Black et al. (2006;
2008) for applications to discrete data.
12Furthermore, much evidence (e.g., Black et al. 2002, and Autor and Duggan 2003)
suggests this nonparticipation due to disability is quite sensitive to prevailing economic
opportunities, particularly for the low skilled. In addition, the increased incarceration of
black males, noted by Western (2006) and others, also makes the use of observed wages
problematic.
13For small values the log wage gap is approximately equal to the percentage wage gap.
This approximation is not very good, though, for gaps as large as those we observe here.
The percentage wage gaps implied by our estimates for 1940 through 2000 are, respec-
tively, −0.52, −0.40, −0.40, −0.36, −0.27, −0.24, and −0.23. By way of comparison,
Smith andWelch (1989) give estimates for 1940 through 1980, respectively:−0.57,−0.45,
−0.42, −0.36, and −0.27. The basic story is of course the same in the two accounts;
differences presumably have to do with differences in our handling of certain data issues,
as outlined in the appendix.
14In each column, the standard errors are clustered on the level of the “cells” in our non-
parametric analysis. We also checked the impact of clustering at the MSA level. While
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the standard errors were larger (typically about two to three times as large), the increase
appears to be the result of the reduction in the degrees of freedom rather than correlation
within the MSA. Thus, we kept our standard errors clustered at the level in which our
data vary.
15One might be concerned about selection across locations. Our goal in this paper is
to show that ignoring locational differences, as other studies have done, leads to inac-
curate estimates. In our estimation, therefore, we treat the selection across locations as
exogenous.
16Estimates reported in Table 1 use as the dependent variable, log weekly wage,
the same variable examined by Smith and Welch. It turns out that there are differ-
ences between black and white workers in the number of hours typically worked per
week, so we might alternatively evaluate hourly wages in constructing racial wage
gaps. Results of this latter analysis, however, are very similar to those one would
draw from Table 1. We substantially overestimate black-white wage convergence
over the 1940–2000 period if we fail to account for shifting patterns of location.
17While there has been much work on possible causes of such productivity differences
(e.g., see Acemoglu 1996; Glaeser and Mare 2001, and other work on agglomeration), we
are agnostic here about the source of this variation.
18See, for example, Rosen (1985).
19As discussed in the appendix, we lack the necessary data to conduct this exercise for
1960, and so omit that year from our analysis.
20As we note above, pessimistic as our results are, they may still understate the current
levels of labor market disparity, as we do not account for racial differences in participa-
tion or unemployment. See, e.g., Black (1995), Chandra (2000), Neal (2006), and Ritter
and Taylor (2011).
21Because of the increasedmechanization of agricultural production in the U.S., there has
been a dramatic reduction in farm labor and a corresponding increase in the size of farms;
farming has become quite capital intensive. It is therefore difficult to separate the returns
to capital from the returns to labor. We exclude wage-and-salary agricultural workers
because payments to workers often involve payments in-kind, which makes the valuation
of the wage paid difficult. Of course, the exclusion of agricultural workers has little effect
in 2000, but represents a major exclusion for the early years. Excluding self-employed
agricultural workers has the added advantage of rendering the 1940 Census compati-
ble with subsequent Decennial Censuses, as the Census did not ask for farm earnings
in 1940.
22See, e.g., Wooldridge (2007) for a discussion.
23Prior to 1980, the Census did not release the five-percent samples.
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